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The Navarino Line is a new 2-way draw position named after a naval battle that was instrumental in obtaining Greece's independence from the Ottoman Empire. In the recently-concluded first round of the VGFP2002 Tournament (game 'vgfp2007'), I found myself as France attempting to negotiate a 2-way draw with Russia. According to my original article, Stable 2-way Draws in Standard Diplomacy (S2001M), a stable 2-way FR draw could only be achieved with a position that required a significant southern navy for Russia. However, Russia had been allied with Turkey for most of the game and did not have a single fleet in the south. France, meanwhile, had been allied with Germany for most of the game and was predominantly a naval power. I thought that I had already found all reasonable stalemate positions, but now it occurred to me that there might be a position that would exist only if each side accepted a restriction in the number of fleets or armies it could have. Indeed, there is such a position. The key is to severely restrict the Russian navy and the French army. (The western position could also be occupied by Italy.) The Russian line, from top to bottom, is: F Bar, A Nwy, F Ska, A Den, F Bal, A Ber, A Mun, A Trl, A Vie, A Bud, A Ser, U Bul, U Con, U Smy, U Syr. The French line is: F Nrg, F Nth, F Hel, F Kie, A Ruh, A Bur, U Pie, U Ven, U Tri, U Alb, F Gre, F Aeg, F Eas. These lines require 15 and 13 front-line units respectively, so there are few available for support. Seventeen units cannot hold either line in general; however, the negotiated restrictions make it possible. The Russian units in Norway and Denmark must be armies to eliminate the support requirements for North Sea and Norwegian Sea. At least 2, and preferably 3, of the Russian units in Bulgaria and Turkey must be armies so that F Aeg and F Smy can also be maintained by mutual support. The French units in Greece and Kiel must be fleets to minimize the support requirements for Munich and Serbia. (If at all possible, the Russian player should insist on fleet occupation of some of Albania, Trieste, Venice, and Piedmont.) With these restrictions, each side needs only 16 units. After front-line units have been used for support where possible, the only spaces that need additional support are Tyrolia, Kiel, Trieste, and Greece, and these can be supported from Bohemia, Holland, Adriatic Sea, and Ionian Sea. Early planning is crucial for the Navarino line because of the need for considerable build restrictions. It is interesting to note that one would not want one's ally to defer builds, as is usual, because the wrong kind of unit late is more dangerous than the right kind of unit early. The total number of units required can be cut considerably if the restrictions are more extreme. If Russia has no southern fleets, then the French fleets in Aeg and Eas are unnecessary. If France has no armies east of Piedmont, then Russia can dispense with his armies in Ser, Bud, and Boh. Accordingly, this could be one of the easier lines to accomplish, with only 13 and 14 units needed, given maximum restrictions. The curious fact about this position is that a stab would likely occur in the winter builds rather than in a movement phase. France needs to position units where they can respond to an unauthorized build. For example, if Russia has no southern fleets, France should keep reserves in Tyn, Wes, and MAO, which would allow them to reach their posts in Aeg, Eas, and Ion in time. France could also insist that Russia post the fleet intended for Bar in Stp instead, which is feasible given standing orders for Nrg-Bar, Stp-Bar. This would prevent Russia from building another northern fleet. In exchange, Russia must be careful that France does not set up the possibility of a long convoy to Austria or the Balkans. I wish I could report that I achieved a draw with the Navarino line in 'vgfp2007', but alas, it was not planned far enough ahead. I had stabbed Germany and gone for a solo, but fallen short, leaving Turkey as the only credible threat to an FR draw. The risk was too great for Russia, and we settled for a 3-way. Had I been able to foresee the failure of my solo bid, I probably could have arranged for Russia to stab Turkey at the same time I stabbed Germany, and I am fairly confident that the Navarino line could have been established in that game.
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