Norway

By  Edward Hawthorne

Though the title of this essay depicts Norway, attention will be focused on parity of the Scandanavian triangle and the dynamics of a Northern alliance. If executed with lightning speed against flanking powers, the EGR can cross all stalemate lines in the South. However, while Scandanavia serves as the spring board for a Northern alliance, it also remains a powder-keg of vulnerability. The intent of this little collection of thoughts is to serve as an "ice-breaker" in opening negotiations between Northern powers and the formation of a cohesive Northern alliance. A Brief History: It's important to understand the internal strife Scandanavia endured in the early 1800's through the second decade of 1900 to better understand its role to England, Germany and Russia. During the Napoleonic Wars, Denmark sided with France against Great Britain. Britain had been Norway's chief trading partner, but suddenly decided to end the trade. British warships blockaded Norway's trade with other countries, and as a result, many Norwegians starved. Cut off from Denmark by the British blockade, Norway took matters into their hands and began to manage its own affairs. In 1813, Denmark was defeated by Sweden. In the Treaty of Kiel, Denmark gave Norway to Sweden but the Norwegians did not recognize the treaty and instead, elected to assemble a constitution for an independent Norway. Sweden refused to grant independence or any trade control and sent forces to quickly defeat any further uprising. By the 1890's, Norway's merchant fleet was one of the largest in the world, but the Swedish foreign service still handled Norway's shipping affairs in overseas trading centers. Norway demanded its own foreign service, but Sweden refused. In May, 1905, the Norwegian parliament passed a law creating a foreign service that ended the union with Sweden which, by September of the same year, yielded Norway's independence. By the time World War I started, Norway's economy had grown and sided with the Allies by forming convoy lines for precious materials, supplies and machinery between the English isle and the European mainland while remaining officially neutral. Unfortunately, approximately half its ships were sunk by German submarines and mines. The Northern Alliance: Some of the most challenging alliances to recognize are longitude alliances. You know, the Northern and Southern alliances of England, Germany and Russia versus some combination of France, Italy, Austria and Turkey. These aren't incredibly difficult alliances to form though maintenance is as challenging as any other, and late recognition by opposing powers can yield quick progress for the North. If you're a basketball fan, then you've probably heard of the term "triangle offense". In Diplomacy, the same concept applies. Two or three allied powers may advance their line until one becomes briefly stalemated. The offense (or support) must then "swing" or "pass" quickly to another ally in the triangled-alliance to exploit the defense. Allan Calhamer understood triangles and challenged the hobby to scrutinize them in his article, Across the Whole Board and his book, "Calhamer on Diplomacy". In the latter, Mr. Calhamer briefly touched on longitude alliances -- still a triangle "offense" -- but did not help to identify such. Hopefully you will agree with me, the litmus test to identifying a Northern alliance lies in Scandanavia. If the North is to be successful, opening strategies should extend well beyond Spring '01. This is an obvious statement but England and Germany's coordinated opening will set the pace of the alliance as Russia "lays low in the reeds". Though Germany's long-term role is significant with a split front, let us take a closer look at the flanking powers first. Keep in mind that individually, each power's opening is solid but when executed in concert, make a well hidden juggernaut. Russia's immediate value to the alliance is its position across the stalemate line and boarder with Turkey. This also lends to exended exposure if AT unite early in the game. This is the primary reason why Russia should remain discreet about the Northern alliance and seek out another ally in the East as normal. Germany can not afford to render significant support until France is dismantled which means Russia remains independent until Germany can afford to move to Tyrolia. A standard DMZ in the corridor or alley between Russia and Germany should give the Kaiser assurance that Fleet Kiel-Holland and Army Berlin-Kiel is sound while the Tsar opens South. Though Russia's Southern opening is likely to be interpreted as standard the Eastern triangle may feel disgruntled over Sweden when Russia builds south. A pseudo Southeastern ally will only serve to maximize The Odd Theory for the North. The Bulgarian Gambit and Lepanto make Austria and Italy the preferred allies respectively however, an AIRhead Alliance would work as well. After Fall '01, Russia may be tempted to stage a dramatic tirade at the sight of an English army in Norway but the Tsar should resist since Germany's actions may leave the South suspecious. Trust me, save the drama for private screening. Eventually, whether it occurs in the Balkans or in Turkey, Russia will need to stab Austria. Germany's coordination is vital in order to flood Tyrolia, Piedmont and Bohemia simultaneously. Ideally, Russia should have seven or eight units (Sweden, Rumania, Ankara and/or Smyrna and home) when the attack on Austria begins, but don't wait too long. England's overall objective is similar to Russia's -- to push a flanking position and cross a major stalemate line. Specifically, England should gain Iberia and break through the Med before the South can form one of several stalemate lines. Germany's inland role is accelerated in the event France and/or Italy form a Tyrrhenian stalemate. Converse to Russia's mainstream approach, England should open Southern:  Edinburgh-North Sea, London to the Channel and Liverpool-Yorkshire. Yes, Liverpool to Yorkshire en route to Norway! The Pouch's Library of Diplomacy Openings outlines England's Fall moves as: "ATLANTIC BIND -- In the Fall 1901 continuation of a Southern opening, England sends the Channel fleet into the Mid-Atlantic Ocean while convoying to Norway. England passes up the slim chance of Brest in exchange for the forward position. (The MAO is much harder for England to take once France builds a second fleet.) If expelled from MAO, the English fleet can move to the Western Mediterranean, threatening Spain, Tunis, and the Gulf of Lyon." In the second year, England should look to convoy army Norway into Belgium for a second build in its advance towards Brest. As the years pass, England should have eight units (Norway, Belgium, Brest, Portugal, Spain and home) with the bulk of its fleets positioned in and around southern Italy. Germany should follow its two flanking powers with a Dutch Opening as mentioned above -- Kiel-Holland, Berlin to Kiel and Munich-Burgundy -- the Burgundy attack variant. The immediate goal is to minimize France's builds. A bounce in Burgundy will leave ownership of Belgium to... Germany if France has opened standard:  Paris-Burgundy, Brest-Mid Atlantic and Marseilles-Spain. Other French openings need to be considered: France supports Paris-Burgundy with Marseilles. France sends Brest-Channel and Paris-Picardy. France sends Marseilles-Burgundy in addition to #2. France sends Brest-Mid Atlantic, Paris-Gascony and Marseilles-Burgundy. There are many more French openings to think about but if France has opened standard, (this is your clue to diplom for a standard opening) then Munich-Burgundy should be repeated in the Fall with the intent of bouncing Paris. Regardless of France's opening, Germany should issue Fleet Holland-Belgium to advance the second EG fleet. By bouncing in Burgundy for a year and advancing the German fleet, EG gains valued position on Iberia and the Med. Germany is guaranteed two builds whether a Belgium bounce occurs or not. Ownership of Holland can be decided in the second year if Holland-Belgium succeeds. Ideally, it should go to Germany under strict agreement that Belgium be given to England. If Italy can be recruited to join the obvious EG against France, then all the better. As the game advances, Germany should coordinate with Russia on the timing of the AI campaign. By now, Austria will likely be entrenched with six or seven units and most vulnerable in Turkey. As mentioned in the Russia section, don't wait for Turkey's elimination before an Austrian attack is launched. Germany's seven units (Denmark, Holland, Paris, Marseilles and home) should be sufficient to flood Tyrolia and Piedmont with ease as Italy braces for a sea invasion from England. Optimisitically, the Northern alliance will advance with aid from pseudo allies in Italy fighting France, and Austria fighting Turkey. The early segmented triangles then appear as EGI against France and RA against Turkey, thus breaking down the southen corners and ultimately dissolving any Southern Stalemate Positions. If there is complete parity in the north, then expect the following in Fall '01: England takes Norway with an army. Germany takes Denmark with an army. Russia sails into Sweden with a fleet. The weak spot in the Northern alliance is in the middle. Germany and Russia are responsible for guarding against any possible compromise by staging conflict or timely bounces. Italy moving to Tyrolia and Austria moving to Bohemia or Galicia would not be a good thing. Diplom for DMZs until the timing is right. A Slow Burning Fuse: As mentioned, Scandanavia remains a vulnerable spot of temptation for all Northern powers and Norway is key. Many would agree there are a number of powder-keg regions in the game of Diplomacy. By powder-keg, I mean areas that ignite immediate concern, frustration or anger from neighboring powers regardless if the advancing unit is just "passing through" or simply retreating (this includes forward retreats, Chris Martin) to a vacant position. Home centers are discounted since that's a whole different topic, but Belgium, the North Sea, Tyrolia, Black Sea, Gascony, Serbia and Norway are a few powder-kegs that come to mind. Yes, I did say Norway. Few people would consider Norway the fuse that affects all seven powers. It's a slow burn but one that everyone should pay close attention to. Norway means different things to different powers. Russia often sees Norway as its second build on the Northern front. If Russia opens North or builds a unit in St Petersburg, then a fight for Norway is guaranteed as was the case at the 2002 Tempest in a Teapot Tournament. Using a brief snap-shot of a game played, Chris Martin (Russia) tactfully expressed his expectations on how I (England) should take Norway:  An English army would yield a Russian build in StP. Chris opened South while I opened with a Yorkshire Pudding. Mister Martin reiterated his expectations with me during Fall negotiations but after speaking with AT, I knew Russia was going to be under extreme pressure in the south. Knowing that Germany was going to ally with Russia since he had opened with Kiel-Hol and Ber-Kiel, I convoyed Yor-Nth-Nwy hoping Chris would use his single build from Sweden, in War or Mos. Those of you who know Chris don't need to read the rest of this paragraph because yes, he backed-up his word, as all good diplomacy players should, by building army StP despite the risk of losing his southern front. A short time later, I had lost Norway at the hands of RG. Yes, Chris Martin took Norway sending my army swimming in to the abyss. Since Norway is inaccessible to Germany and the Southern powers in the first year many consider it England's claim -- often its first build -- but what should England do if Russia has opened North? Convoying an army expends two-thirds of England's force. While a successful convoy will leave England breathing a huge sigh of relief, it may prove detrimental to ER's relationship. If England chooses to convoy, it should be with Norwegian support, if at all possible. In the event England is faced with a GR alliance, many inexperienced players make the mistake of convoying to Norway with North Sea support and setting the stage for failure if Germany decides to issue Holland-North with Russia's St Petersburg-Norway. This leaves England in dire straits with zero builds while the GR has superior position and builds. Under such circumstance, with disregard to player personalities and external aid from other powers, England should consider Norway lost. Leaving the army stranded to defend the isle and taking Norway with a fleet is conservative but not without risk. If the same support unit is used in a convoy then North Sea-Norway leaves the North vulnerable in the same turn and Norway in the next, especially if Russia has built in StP. Norway can be supported from the Norwegian Sea causing any aggressive power to attack with a force of three but if fleet Norwegian is used to retake the North Sea then expect to send fleet Norway to Barents Sea or Skagerrak in the retreat phase. In most instances, Germany welcomes an English convoy to Norway. This is likely an indicator that ER are going to fight over position while Germany may pick and choose terms to her benefit. Likewise, this means England will be preoccupied to guard his North allowing Germany time to leverage her neighbors, France and Russia, for additional anti-English moves. For this reason, England should not convoy to Norway unless he is assured of German assistance -- agreeing to bounce Russia in Sweden is a good sign but never guaranteed even if the Kaiser is looking you in the eyes. If Germany is looking for a friend in the east, then Denmark holds or accidentally misorders. An appreciative Tsar will be more inclined to offer support to Germany than England. Conversely, if Russia is making excellent gains to his south, then a bounce in Sweden is called for. This means England has taken Norway (with army or fleet) while Germany has Russia thwarted for another season. If a determined Northern alliance exists, a bounce scenario in Sweden is nonexistent. So is it premature for France, Italy, Austria and Turkey to feel alarmed if the Scandanavian region is occupied and no one builds to buffet their northern claim? What if the region is suddenly vacated in Spring '02? By now, the South should be in intense discussion to save France and Turkey while Italy and Austria move to the middle. Unfortunately, if the North has effectively waived the golden carrot infront of AI, then immediate gains will overshadow the pending doom on the Southern horizon. Regardless if a Northern alliance exists or not, DMZing Scandanavia leaves England, Germany and Russia tempted to stab for centers and position. Conversely, static units serve to guard a position that holds no value if perpetual hold orders are issued by three different powers. Norway is the exception to this statement because of potential support or invasion of the North Sea and the close proximity of St Petersburg. Barring cut support, Norway and a second unit -- Finland, Barents Sea, Gulf of Bothnia -- can forever hold St Petersburg from any southern assault. For this very reason, neither Turkey, Austria or Italy for that matter, should ever be allowed to take St Petersburg. (That said, I once supported my own army Mos-StP with fleet Norway as Turkey!) Red Rover, Red Rover send Norway Right Over: One very interesting thing about Norway that many players over look (including myself) is the super highway between the East and West. Eugene Hung (author of the Munich essay) pointed out, "A unit adjacent to the North Sea, ie. London, can reach Moscow (far in the East!) in three moves using NWY and STP. Also, NWY is very important for Russia... control of Norway is critical to get Russian fleets out quickly to the West. Remove Norway from Russian control and it takes at least two moves that cannot have any support (STP/nc - BAR, BAR - NWG) before a Russian fleet can impact the Northwest." It's no wonder England fears a Russian fleet on the North coast of St Petersburg and Russia discourages an English convoy. Speaking of convoys, if England, or any other western power, is on the defensive, they may choose to use three units to hold their position or, as an added bonus, attempt a convoy assuming a North Sea fleet is available, to any one of the five available centers that boarder the North Sea. Personally, Denmark, Holland or Belgium are my favorites. You might want to ask for France or Germany's permission before you suddenly land in one of their centers... or not. Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on what power you are, retreating from Norway can be a trickier matter compounded by the type of retreating unit. There are seven regions adjacent to Norway but only six viable for fleets and half that for armies. While Norway touches Finland, fleets are prohibited from sailing to and fro in the same season. Some people try but it's yet to succeed. In the same manner, St Petersburg is complicated by coastal specifications which requires special detail when writing a retreat order. Fleet Norway should not attempt to move/retreat to StP(sc). The same applies for StP(ec) and StP(wc) specifications.   Regardless of your intent or alliance, please take special care to use "Nwy" when writing an abbreviation for Norway. Many players, new and old, have gotten into the nasty habit of writing the abbreviation as:  "Nor".  Keep in mind that some face-to-face venues allow, "Nor" as an acceptable abbreviation for Norway but it may also be accepted as Norwegian, North Sea, North Atlantic, and North Africa. How ambigious would it be if someone issued a convoy order for "army Edi-Nor-Nor supported by Nor"? What if "fleet Nor" was dislodged? "Nor" nor "Nor" is defined so "Edi-Nor" supported by "Nor" should not succeed unless "Nor" is the supporting unit and "Edi-Nor-Nor" is uncontested in "Nor". Any nor questions? . . . . . . . . . . . I have a theory. Constant, long-term success cannot be attributed to luck. There must be some driving force, some thread of knowledge or some mastery skill-level of the subject to be successful time and time again. Whether you agree with me or not, one fact stands above all others. Manus, for the past eight years, you've successfully enriched hundreds of readers and brought countless more to the hobby, all through a little place on the web called, the Diplomatic Pouch. I'm confident I represent hundreds upon hundreds of Diplomacy players when I say, "Thank you for what you've done."     Edward Hawthorne (edward@diplom.org) If you wish to e-mail feedback on this article to the author, and clicking on the mail address above does not work for you, feel free to use the "Dear DP..." mail interface.