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Sweden: Land of contention, perhaps the neutral most likely to remain unconquered at the end of F1901, and a center around which nations can wither or thrive. Germany bounces Russia out of Sweden much more often than not – as definite as I can safely be without statistics readily at hand – creating a trend that usually results in Russia being reduced down to a two-center defender of the stalemate line much faster than anyone should be able to predict. At least two countries have to be involved to produce this phenomenon, and often all four of Russia’s neighbors are taking a poke at the largest power on the board once they sense any sort of weakness. Strangely, not only is the German almost always among those chipping away at the Russian frontier, he is often one of the first. The question here is; why is Germany bouncing Russia out of Sweden? The dynamics of the board suggest that Russia is not a significant rival to the German until after the West has been sorted out, with the only possible exception being that of a Western Triple. Barring holistic theater alliances, Scandinavia is the one place on the board where early cross-theater action takes place: a region wherein the powers of England, Germany, and Russia clash almost from the onset of the game. Where this area should be dynamic, it is stale; where there should be hard, tense diplomatic negotiations, there is only the morose Russia, half-heartedly requesting permission to sail into Sweden with all the hopeful prospects of a Polish military offensive or a land war in Asia. The question then becomes two fold: what is motivating the Kaiser to bounce the Russian, and why is the Russian both allowing this abuse and ordering movements that he knows will fail? Let us address Germany first. Excluding obvious exceptions such as a Russian army in Prussia or Silesia or a Western Triple, Germany has almost no motivation or vested interest in denying Sweden to the Russians. In fact, the bounce in Sweden often sows the seeds of Germany’s undoing, as the angered Bear has nothing better to do with his lone fleet but sail about and confound the German war machine. He pushes for the Baltic, perhaps strikes West with an army to Prussia forcing the German into a two front war – one which the Kaiser cannot possibly win, leading to his eventual downfall. This is but one extreme case, as the Russian often does not have that extra army to spare, or is unwilling to give up the ghost in 1902 and simply seek punitive action against the German. Still, the St. Petersburg fleet, even if not in the Baltic, becomes a factor that Germany must contend with; a hostile force that must be calculated into every offensive, and an unfriendly force anchored just one move away from German shores. The Russian often supports the English into Sweden simply to punish the German and to relieve pressure from St. Petersburg. A fleet that was once innocuous and potentially friendly now becomes the tool of the enemies of the German Empire. The German starts out of the gate with the uncomfortable knowledge that an Anglo-French Alliance can crush him in a few game turns, that almost every power on the board needs to obtain Munich to reach 18 supply centers, and that there are more open provinces surrounding the German homeland than any other power save Russia. In other words, Germany begins the game more vulnerable than his neighbors, a target in the eyes of the majority of the board, and endowed with porous borders that are both easily penetrated and cannot possibly be fully defended. Yet the German insists on picking a fight with the one neighbor that is the least interested in taking a shot at German holdings, and is the most interested in seeing Germany survive to hold back a wily England. Moreover, by immediately alienating and crippling a potential ally in F1901, the German loses the race before it even starts. Without Russia defending St. Petersburg with the unit built from the annexation of Sweden, the Russian is effectively forced to abandon the Northern Front, desperately hoping to gain a build to the South, or perhaps from a small campaign against the German, in order to put a stopper in the North. More often than not, the Russian dreams of another build are dashed on the rocks of an aggressive England and the lack of allies in the South who can already smell the blood of the wounded Bear and are clamoring to get their piece of the carcass. Again, Germany’s brash denial of Sweden tends to strengthen rival powers, while his own nation flounders at five or six units. Where the Russian and the German can work together to compensate for Germany’s porous frontiers and the weakness of Russia’s Northern front, Germany chooses to undermine both nations in a petty bounce; the price of which can easily be the total subjugation of both the Kaiser and the Czar to the rest of the board. The denial of Sweden, then, gains the German nothing except significant ill will, heightened vulnerability, and one less potential friend in an unforgiving world that respects nothing but the sword, all while strengthening his rivals and sealing his fate. Given all this, why is Germany ordering Denmark to Sweden? Perhaps it is a knee-jerk response to the game: the German sees a chance to keep another power down, so he takes it, as it seemingly costs him nothing. This German is either unable, or has never been in the position, to connect his long-term prosperity with that of the Russian. As we have seen, the costs of bouncing in Sweden can be very high, if not immediately obvious. Perhaps the German has been persuaded by other powers to deny Sweden to the Russian, but once again, while that movement is a gain for other powers to the South or to England, Germany still bears the brunt of the offense while other parties collect the gains. Bottom line: Germany gains nothing from the bounce in Sweden, putting to question all motivation for writing the order, as it only helps his enemies and loses him friends. So unless you are the spearhead of a Western Triple that you trust completely in F1901, or the Russian is pushing West, stop bouncing the poor guy and see what new dynamics can be forged with a viable Russian in Scandinavia, or at least one that has not been hamstrung before 1902. Now to the Russian: Why is it that Germany never negotiates the movement of St. Petersburg with you? Why is it that when you arrive in the Gulf of Bothnia, with the supposed threat of the move to Baltic, you doggedly move to Sweden only half-hoping to get in? The bounce in Sweden creates a stale dynamic in the North; a series of predicable movements where in the Russian gets the short end of the stick and is reduced to punitive attacks on Germany that may, at best, result in the German crumbling only slightly slower than the Russian Empire that clings to life on the stalemate line. Given this dismal scenario, stop threatening to move to the Baltic and start doing it whenever you sense that the German is going to bounce you. We all know that voice in the back of our heads, only partially drowned out by the voices of hope and greed; that little voice that tells us we are not going to gain Sweden, and we barely blink during adjudication when our triumphal armada fails to conquer Sweden and is returned shamefacedly to the Gulf of Bothnia by the spiteful Germans. Start listening to that voice. Many will be quick to attack this suggestion, throwing out such catch phrases as “poor position” or “untenable” or even “unproductive.” Immediately, I would point out that the movement to the Baltic happens so infrequently that critiques of the position are largely biased by past play. Players are often uncomfortable with new movements and new twists, and look hard for the tactical faults while ignoring the diplomatic gains. Simply put, the position has just not been played enough to know all the advantages and disadvantages to any significant degree. That said, I would agree that a Russian Fleet in the Baltic in S1902 is not the most tactically sound position to be in, but Diplomacy is not a game built on tactics alone, with that in mind let us explore the whole picture and some potential benefits. First and foremost, the movement to the Baltic gains us immeasurable currency in our bid for Sweden, because the moment Russians start following through with the Baltic threat is the same moment that Germans start to take it seriously. A threat is only a useful tool when it has some teeth, and as no German really believes it will happen, it’s currently nothing more than the musings of a Power beholden to the German whim -- no more substantial than words in the wind. Many will address the weakness of being in the Baltic without any sort of support, and of leaving St. Petersburg undefended. Yet these are exactly the same conditions under which Russia must manage Sweden once the Russian Fleet runs ashore. No support, St. Petersburg is undefended, and a lone Russian Fleet must defend against the scheming of a Unit in Norway and a Fleet in Denmark. Moreover, the Baltic is where the Russian wants to be if he is denied Sweden, and is often where he orders his unit next, although it movement has now become only half as effective in 1902, and a Fleet in the Gulf of Bothnia has little diplomatic leverage. Next, there are those that will point out the anger of the German, and the destruction of relations between Germany and Russia. Again, this is exactly the same condition that results from the bounce Sweden. While many do not equate the two positions as being equal, there is more than enough evidence to suggest that both slights are of equal weight. Both have the potential to completely cripple a country, and while the Russian is afloat off the German homeland as opposed to off the Russian homeland, the difference is minimal. Not only will the same units be tied up defending the Baltic and perhaps Prussia or Silesia from the irate Russian, but being in the Baltic is still just a threat, the Russian has little interest in attempting to hold a piece of the German homeland with a lone fleet. He would much rather set sail for Sweden where he should have been the phase before, a fact that any self-respecting German will know at a glance. Finally, there is the diplomatic potential inherent in the move to the Baltic. The potential for alliance between England and Russia springs to new heights when the Russian is able to cut supports or pull the English into Denmark. Whereas the English and the Russian are largely at odds over Scandinavia in 1901, the Baltic movement changes the entire dynamic of that area for 1902. Options aplenty are now open to both powers. Norway can easily be exchanged for Denmark and Sweden, for example, and a lasting rapport and alliance could develop between the two nations. All too often England ends up with St. Petersburg because of a shortsighted German denying the Russian Sweden in F1901 -- more often due to lack of options and limited opportunity than to long term tactical or diplomatic motivation. When in the Gulf of Bothnia there is little the crippled Russian can do in negotiations with England other than to present the English with the uncomfortable options of either irritating Germany or attacking a declining power. In the end, regardless of any vacillation, England usually ends up trying to pry his way into St. Petersburg, if only to slow down one of the Eastern powers from gobbling up the entirety of a weakened Russia. Despite falling a bit short of the title of “tactically sound,” the movement to the Baltic gains the Russian currency on his threat to move there if he is not fully assured that his claim over Sweden will be actualized, while opening new avenues and diplomatic opportunities with both England and Germany that are simply not available while in the Gulf of Bothnia. Most importantly, these advantages are realized under the same conditions that exist when Russia is bounced in Sweden: Russo-Germanic relations are strained and the Russian is out of position. Even the tactical analysis that says the Baltic is too far away to protect St. Petersburg must yield to the fact that this would be equally true if Sweden were gained, while acknowledging that a Russian who is snubbed in Sweden will often want to be in a position to punish the offending German for his unmotivated bounce. Even in the off chance that there is a Western Triple, the Baltic is a far superior position to be in if the Russian hopes to slow the onslaught of the West, as Germany is usually the front runner. After taking a long hard look at the board, we come to two conclusions: it is almost never within the bounds of German interests to deny Russia Sweden, and it is almost always in the best interest of the Russian to move to the Baltic if he gets any inkling that he will be bounced. These will remain truisms until those behind the wheel in Germany begin to connect the health of their nation with that of Sweden and open diplomatic negotiations with Russia in S1901 with something along the lines of, “Hey, if you move to Finland, I will guarantee you Sweden.” Only with a healthy dose of fear will the German be brought into line. Until that time, my Russian friend, remember: Baltic ho!
[Editor's Note:
For more on Sweden, check out
Dan Miller's global perspective.]
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