Why do we start our discussion with the defensive, rather than the attack? For several reasons, chief among them that it is the defender who profits from fighting. 'The aggressor is always peace-loving...he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.' Additionally, every nation's war plans must include strategic defense - even the attacker must take pains to protect his conquests. Finally, the defense is the stronger form of war, though its potential is often overlooked. First, let us examine the nature of the defense, and its relationship to the attack...

'The defense enjoys the advantage of terrain, while the attacker has the advantage of initiative.'

The attacker has one advantage - he is free to strike anywhere along the line of the defense, and may thus dictate the course and nature of the war. In contrast, the defense has all of the advantages descendent from the fact that he actually possesses the terrain in question:

1. 'It is easier to hold ground than to take it.'

   The attacker has the positive goal, and must overcome his opponent to achieve it. The defender has the negative goal, and has achieved it as long as he is not overcome. A deadlocked or evenly matched struggle is a victory for the defender, and a loss for the attacker. The implications of this are plain to see - if the skill levels are comparable, then the attacker MUST employ greater force to have any hope of making progress. For advantages terrain, this can even mean that greatly superior force is needed. Why does the Anglo-German alliance routinely fail to crack a determined French defense? Because the French possess the terrain which is being contested, and have all the advantage in holding it. The English and Germans simply have a hard time projecting enough strength to overcome this natural advantage.

2. 'Time which is allowed to pass unused accumulates to the credit of the defender.'

   The goal of a well-planned attack is to achieve one's objectives as quickly as possible. The goal of a well-planned defense is to delay a decision for as long as possible. For every turn that the attackers units are tied up in a stalled offensive, they are not available for other uses - including defense of the attacker's lands, or growth elsewhere on the board. A Russia who allows himself to get deadlocked while invading Austria or Turkey has committed a large part of his military to a campaign which is not providing gains. The longer Russia is thus preoccupied, the greater the chances that he will be overtaken by one of northern neighbors, and the weaker he will be when that confrontation comes.

3. 'The defender is better placed to spring surprises by the strength and direction of his attacks.'

   By the very progress he makes, the attacker usually exposes himself to attack either by the country he is invading or by outside parties. When an attack is going well, the attacker often grows over- confident and fails to protect himself adequately. When an attack has bogged down, the attacker is often unable to spare the units necessary for an adequate defense. Either way, sudden onslaughts from an unexpected direction can throw even the best asttacks into disarray. Consider the English invasion of France - by the very fact that England must concentrate on attacking the French, he is often ill-prepared to react even to French incursion into the Irish Sea or NAO, let alone to an unexpected Russian or German sortie into the North or Norwegian Seas. The point is, once the war has been joined, the attacker can usually achieve only tactical surprise - only the defender can routinely achieve strategical surprise.

4. 'The defender can count on outside assistance more than can the attacker; and the more his survival matters to the rest...the more certain he can be of their help.'

   Read another way, the attacker forms his allies before the attack, the defender gains his allies once he has been attacked - and the more important the defender is to checking the growth of the attacker, the more allies are willing to come to his aid. Only the foolish or desperate rush to aid a strong opponent in destroying a weaker one.

'Pure defense would be contrary to the art of war,
since it would mean that only one side was waging it.'

Simply holding ground, and denying it to the enemy is the easiest, and therefore the strongest, form of war, but it will not bring victory on its own. If you adhere to a strictly passive defense, at best will never gain - at worst, you will eventually be bypassed. Austria is usually the target of one or more of Turkey, Russia, and/or Italy, and must defend herself from them - but the best defense is NOT to simply hold with mutual supports for the entire game. At best, Austria will be ignored and will end the game with three centers. More likely, somebody will eventually crack the defensive cordon and lay waste to the SCs. 'If we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows.' If the threat is Russia, then strike for Warsaw and Rumania. If the threat is Turkey, strike at Bulgaria and move your fleet to threaten the Aegean. If the threat is Italy, take pains to secure Venice. At the least, strike out and deny the Balkans to your opponent. The passive defense is strong and useful, but it is not worthy of indefinite policy.

'The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.'

Protect your provinces by attacking the provinces which are adjacent to them. Strike your opponent's units BEFORE they are in position to force you out. Hit advance units with all your strength when their retreat is blocked by their reinforcements. If Italy threatens Marseilles, take Tunis. Static defense is strong and can slow, sometimes even stop, the opponent - but well-aimed and timed counter-attack can throw the entire attack into disarray, and can sometimes turn the tide of the war. Your goal is not to resist the invader's most powerful blows, but to make sure he never has the chance to deliver the strike he plans for. Even if you are forced into a static defense, always look for a chance to hit back. In fact, let me end this with Clausewitz's words, which sum up this article nicely:

'A sudden powerful transition to the offensive
-- the flashing sword of vengeance --
is the greatest moment for the defense.'

Read the next article (The Attack)

Joseph Wheeler (corwin@wam.umd.edu)

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