The natural sequel to our discussion of defense, this article will deal with the several aspects of the strategic attack. As usual, we will start by defining the purpose and nature of the attack. As we discussed in Article III, defense is not an absoulate state of waiting and repulse, but is rather permeated with elements of the offensive. In the same way, the attack is continually combined with defense. The essential difference is that one cannot conceive of defense without its necessary element of counter-attack. In contrast, the offensive action is complete in itself. However, there are two considerations which commonly bring defensive acts into an offensive plan:

This consideration is the most common reason for offensive Dip players reverting to periodic defensive roles. In most conflicts, especially early in the game, the offensive players are simply not capable of eliminating their opponents in one fluid attack, and must therefore periodically consolidate and defend their gains while waiting for reinforcements or gains in other theaters. Consider the early-game E/G alliance for the purposes of partitioning France. As France collapses, she naturally folds into a more compact and defensible position, while the front line is simultaneously pushed further and further from the home centers of England and Germany. As any player who has attempted this invasion should know, this attack cannot be completed in one fluid motion, and England and Germany will constantly find themselves pausing to consolidate their gains, prevent French sneak runs around England, and desperately pray for Italian intervention.

Maintaining control of supply centers is a vital concern for all Powers. A successful offensive usually serves to carry one's units away from the home centers which ultimatels support them, and most Dip players tend to view undefended centers as fair game. Therefore, some care must be taken to protect your backfield as you advance, a concern which can tie up a large percentage of the builds gained from the advance. Obviously, some offensive plans yield better returns with less over-extension and vice-versa, so it is very important to remember that as soon as the objective has been attained the attack ends and the defense takes over, so every attack has to take into account the defense which is inherent in it.

There are several considerations which can cause the attacker to lose force during the execution of an invasion, each of which must be understood and planned for:

As our units invest the enemy's territory, they necessarily take on the additional role of defending that territory as our own. This need can weaken our offensive effort as more and more units are needed for defensive purposes. For an example, let's use the common Turkish invasion of Austria - as Turkish forces drive deeper into the Balkans and Austria proper, those forces find that more and more of their effort is directed toward protecting these conquest from counter-attack, as well as from Russian or Italian opportunism. Reinforcements from builds gained can help to offset this trend, but their effectiveness is blunted by two other concerns which also increase with the success of the attack - length of distance to the front, and the need to protect home centers.

This subject has already been largely covered above, but it must be recognized as a major cause of diminishing force in an attack. To continue with our example above, Turkey has little need for extensive defensive units at the start of her attack, as the front will be so close that the attacking units themselves serve a defensive role by their very presence. As the front advances, however, some new units will have to be reserved for purely defensive purposes, as otherwise the home centers will be open for Russian or Italian attacks of convenience.

As the front line advances further and further from the home centers, there is an ever-increasing time lag between a new unit's construction and the point at which it can participate meaningfully in the fight. Thus, countries whose home centers are closer the action (nominally, the defenders) are able to react more quickly and appropriately to changing conditions than can countries further from the action (nominally, the attackers). Thus, as Turkey plows through the Austrian homelands and picks his next opponent, that opponent will be better able to deploy his own builds in response. If Germany is next on the list, then German builds can be placed and maneuvered to the front much faster that Turkish ones, and therefore can take advantage of better knowledge of the conditions that will prevail when they arrive, and can influence the decision far sooner than can any Turkish reinforcements.

Strongly defended points, stalemate lines, and hold-fast lines all represent points which are costly and difficult to break or bypass. To muster enough units at the proper points to deal with them is often time-consuming and almost always requires a significant portion of the entire offensive forces. As a result, the general effect of these positions is to slow down and diminish the force of the attack. Understanding how these positions are developed can help an offensive player to plan for them, and in the best case to prevent them from developing in the first place.

It is a normal state of affairs in Dip that a Power's concerns at the start of an offensive are not the same concerns he has several years into it. As a result, once again, the offensive force is diminished. Consider Turkey has driven Austria back from Greece and Serbia, and has more than sufficient forces on hand to complete the destruction of the Austrian player. By this time, however, the Turk may well have need to be concerned over the intentions of the Russians and/or the Italians. Should he decide that Russia needs dealing with, then that will necessarily require a committment of considerable force to the Russian border, force which is most likely to be largely or even wholly drawn from the Austrian campaign. This represents a relaxation of effort in relation to the Austrian invasion, and can weaken an offensive to the point of stalling or even inviting a counter-attack.

The longer that an offensive war drags on, or the more successful that one particular power is in gaining from that war, then the more likely it becomes that his allies will desert him, either turning directly against him or seeking to make gains elsewhere on the board. This illustrates the fact that an attacker has no true allies - he may have partners willing to aid in an invasion, but the bonds of alliance lose strength in direct proportion to the gains made by the senior partner. The stronger a Power becomes, the more likely it is to become the target of an alliance than to be offered alliance himself.

The final matter to be discussed is the use of diversions, or attacks upon enemy territory with the intention of drawing his forces away from the main objective. In such a diversion, there must be an objective to attack - and only the value of this objective can induce the enemy to expend his force in protecting it. Diversion can be highly useful in weakening the defense around the main objective, but care must be taken not to withdraw too many units from the main scene of operations. The main concern must be that the enemy must withdraw more units from the main objective than are used for the diversion. Several factors can make the decision to mount a diversion favorable:

If France is attacking England for the purpose of claiming Holland and Belgium, then France may freely dispatch a fleet to the North Atlantic or Irish Sea for the purpose of harrassment of the English Isles, since the fleet is of more use there, and would actually contribute less if it were to support the main theatre.

Again, assuming England has left his island relatively undefended, then this is definitely a vulnerable objective which the English can ill afford to lose.

A diversion mounted at Tunis is of little use unless it is completely undefended, since it requires a substantial investment of force for relatively little gain. On the other hand, one aimed at the Balkans can yield a high number of supply centers, and so is generally a good investment - the enemy must either commit a large number of units to defending them, or risk losing a region extremely blessed with supply centers. Either way, the diversion has succeeded.

Thus ends this article on the Attack - a few more points will suffice to sum up what we have covered. Defense is the stronger form of war - thus, if an attack lacks material superiority, it must have moral superiority; where even moral superiority is lacking, there is no point in attacking at all. Prudence is the true spirit of defense, courage and confidence the true spirit of the attack - neither form can do without both qualities, but each has a natural affinity with one of them. The goal of the defender is to delay or avoid a decisive battle, the attacker's is to bring such a battle about. An attacker bent on a major decision has no reason to divide his forces - he should advance on no wider a front than allows him to bring all of his forces to bear simultaneously. The only exception to this is if the defender himself is divided, in which case minor diversions can be put to good advantage. And finally, as always, we shall end with the most important lesson of all, in Clausewitz's own words:

Joseph Wheeler (corwin@wam.umd.edu)

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