Editor's Note: This article is a reprint from Diplomacy World #53, and was written by David Hood, a prominent hobby figure (former editor of Diplomacy World, even!) whose work we have reprinted often. As always, we reproduce it here with the kind permission of DW's current Editor, Douglas Kent. Ever wonder why you see so few Italian-Turkish alliances? In all my games, I've seen only one PBM game and one FTF game where Italy-Turkey was a meaningful alliance — and in both cases Itlay was simply acting as a puppet. If Turkey had wished to take his partner out, in either game, it could have been done with little damage to Turkey's tactical position. At first glance, an Italian-Turkish alliance makes some sense in 1901. After all, the Balkans can be split up between the two very quickly, without the naval jockeying around the Ionian that usually slows things down in the East. Russia can be kept out of Vienna and Budapest quite easily, especially if Italy and Turkey cooperate from the very beginning. Later on, the perennial problem facing Turkish expansion is English or French fleets, which can be dealt with more easily if Italy has been harassing the French coast since 1902. Turkey can also expand north through Russia, and northwest into Germany, with the cooperation of Italian armies. the Italian-Tirukish alliance places Eastern forces on the western front very quickly, since the Italians can attack France with about half their units beginning in 1902. Given all these advantages, why then does Turkey normally look to Russia or Austria for an ally while Italy generally does the same? The "textbook" answer here is that both Italy and Turkey are fleet powers, so they naturally knock heads for control of the seas. Austria, being a land power, is a more workable alliance partner according to this theory. While this view is certainly logical, it does not explain everything. After all, England and France often ally and do little but build fleets in the beginning — and both can be primarily naval powers at the end of the game. The real reason Italian-Turkish alliances are rare concerns the strategic position of Turkey. As we all know, the yellow hordes have to go the farthest of any of the Great Powers in order to get 18 centers. they start out so far away from the stalemate line that it usually takes them forever to cross it. Since the Italian home centers and Tunis are relatively easy for Turkey to get to (by sea), the latter is usually not willing to give them up by allying with Italy herself. Thus, even if Turkey begins the game in an alliance with Italy this does not last long, because Tukey almost always stabs. In short, the Italian-Turkish alliance is inherently unstable. Either Turkey stabs, or Italy stabs Turkey in a pre-emptive strike. The result is that the Italian-Turkish alliance rarely has time to utilize its advantages in breaking into the West quicker than the latter can put up a defense. The exception to this rule (and the reason I've seen two such Italian-Turkish alliances go the distance to game's end) is when Turkey does not play for a solo win. Contrary to this "winning is the only object of Diplomacy" garbage you hear form some people, there really are some players out there who are perfectly willing to forego the win and shoot for a 2-way draw instead. When such a player is Turkey, then an Italian-Turkish alliance begins to make a lot of sense, given its ability to break into the Atlantic and force the draw much faster than either an Austrian-Turkish or Russian-Turkish alliance. Of course, Italy must also be a player of that stripe, or the danger of pre-emptive strikes by the green forces would still be present. Should the Italian-Turkish alliance be used more than it is now? Probably not. It truly is an inferior one in most cases, due to its inherent instability around 1903-1904. But what about when Austria and Russia have already allied, or Turkey is faced with a situation in which both Austria and Russia are irrational weirdos? Then the prudent Turkish player will approach Italy with an alliance proposal that includes explicity mechanisms to reduce instability. Turkey should hold itself to two fleets (maybe three if one is in the Black Sea and remains there). Italy should be encouraged to hold the Ionian with a supporting fleet in Tunis or the Adriatic. This will use up a lot of units, but will likely be worth it in terms of stability. Turkey can leave an army in Smyrna later on to secure its own defense. Italy should be encouraged to attack France in the Spring or Fall of 1902. Only one or two units are necessary in the beginning, since Italy will likely enjoy the element of surprise. Turkey should get only Bulgaria and Rumania in the Balkans, since a more equitable division usually leads to stability problems. Rembmer that the number of centers held by each Power is less important than overall tactical stability. With any luck the excess Italian units will be far away in the Atlantic, too far to pose a threat to Turkey. Thus, Turkey can sit at eight (Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Sevastopol, Moscow, and Warsaw) and wait for the draw to pass. If it does not, then perhaps Berlin or Kiel can be given to the Turks later on. Also remember that after a certain point large numbers of Turkish builds lead to instability in the alliance, since Italy feels threatened. Turkey would to well to decline any builds unless they are absolutely necessary. Assuming an Italian-Turkish alliance is somehow required by the situation on the board, that is one of the best ways to proceed with the alliance. But such cases are quite rare. For the most part, Italian-Turkish cooperation will be limited to participating in triples or defensive fronts. And that's probably the way it should be.
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