I
On the Nature of War

Joseph Wheeler


'War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.'

War is an act of force - this we know all too well. No player can expect to win a game of Diplomacy without bringing some measure of force to bear on his opponents. What too many people overlook is that war does not exist for itself, but only has validity as a tool to do a job - namely, to compel our opponents to do our will. Italy should never undertake a war with Turkey merely to win a war; rather, Italy must decide that such a war is necessary to convince Turkey to accept a specific condition, for example to ensure that Turkish fleets do not establish a presence within the Mediterranean. Once Turkey has been compelled to give up the ability to project her fleet presence into the Mediterranean, this particular war has achieved its goals, and should not be merely continued for form's sake.


'The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.'

This is, in effect, an even stronger statement of the point above, and is included only because this point is so important to a serious discussion of Diplomacy, yet so often ignored in the heat of battle. We cannot stress enough that a war should never be undertaken for its own sake, but only insofar as it furthers our political goal. The first goal should therefore be to define our political goal, and our second to determine when a given war no longer helps us to achieve that goal. Obviously, the ultimate goal for any player of Diplomacy is to be the first Power to control 18 supply centers. However, this only becomes the primary goal in the later stages of the game. As concerns the opening of the game, each power has two primary goals - to assure continued survival and to ensure a possible route of future expansion. Within those broad definitions, each Power has more specific goals which are unique to that Power, and to the current political climate. For example, let us examine Turkey's initial goals and how they relate to an early war with Russia. Turkey's starting goals are to keep the Black Sea and Aegean Sea free of foreign fleets and to open a route of expansion through either the Balkans or the Mediterranean. Hence, the only political goal which can be accomplished by attacking Russia is to prevent Russia from investing the Black Sea or adjacent areas, specifically Armenia and Bulgaria. As long as Russia is restricted to one southern fleet, this goal can be accomplished by occupying the Black Sea ourselves and keeping Armenia either friendly or neutral. If this has been accomplished, there is no further reason for us to attack Russia. If Russia attacks us or brings a second fleet into being, then we can accomplish our goals in the war by the occupation of Sevastopol and the destruction of her fleets. Once this has been accomplished, Turkey cannot immediately benefit from war with Russia, and should seek to make peace.


'War...is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass...but always the collision of two living forces.'

Perhaps an obvious point, and certainly one which only inexperienced players routinely forget. The lesson here is that we cannot formulate beautiful offensive plans and expect our opponent to calmly fold under our attack. As long as the opponent is not defeated, he dictates the course of our conflict as much as we do ourselves. If Italy decides to invade France, he cannot rely on the brilliance of his attack through Marseilles alone to carry the day for him - he must expect that the French player will respond by penetrating the Mediterranean in an attempt to contest the annexation of Marseilles, and additionally to threaten outlying Italian provinces such as Tunis, Naples, and Rome itself. We cannot rely on the opponent to restrict his efforts to provinces of our choosing. A complete plan of attack takes into account ALL possible counters by the opponent, and takes steps to limit the enemy's options.


'War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously. Each side can therefore gauge the other to a large extent by what he is and does, instead of judging him by what he...ought to be or do.'

This, in effect, is a fancy way of saying that the player is as important as the position. Statistically speaking, the Russian player has the least to gain from a three-way partition of Austria, while Turkey gains the most. Yet very few advanced Diplomacy players accept that a Turkish player will always push for such a partition, while the Russian player will always fight against it. Cold rationality is never the sole driving force behind policy, and those who neglect the effects of personality are usually the most indignant at their losses. Far more positions have been saved by an accurate reading of an opponent's temperment and tendencies than by a strictly logical view of the conflict.


'Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.'

Let us turn to the example of a moderately successful England in the early mid-game who faces a German Power. There are three basic political goals which may entice England to war upon the German player: 1) Germany has a large fleet and challenges England's coastal security; 2) England wishes to expand and central Europe seems a likely route; 3) Germany, though land-locked, is more powerful than any of the other Powers, and is thus a threat to the balance of power. If England is fighting to maintain the security of her home centers, she may be expected to fight as long as she is able and with all of her available forces. If the only purpose of the war, however, is to pick up easy centers, then the attack may reasonably be called off, and peace made, if Germany turns out to be a much more formidable opponent than expected. It is important to remember that you should not feel locked into a long and costly war just because it has been undertaken - committing a large percentage of your forces into a slow, deadlocking war can lead to dangerous situations which are not easily corrected by the one or two supply centers you may gain in the long run.


'The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you.'

At least in the early stages of the game, the total destruction of an opponent is rarely feasible, and we may increase our chances of success by requiring minimal sacrifices of our opponents. Perhaps the best example of this is an English assault on St. Peterburgh. If the English goal is the destruction of the Russian player, then he must occupy STP with an army. The Russian player, knowing that such a strategy entails his destruction, will resist such a move with all of his power. On the other hand, if the English player merely intends to deny the Russians naval access to the northern oceans, then he may propose to occupy STP with a fleet. Such a move, while damaging, does not presage the general destruction of the Russian Power, and hence may not be resisted as strongly.


'...The side that feels the lesser urge for peace will naturally get the better bargain.'

This is an important rule which should not only be the basis of your negotiations, but should also influence how you conduct the war. If possible, one should always negotiate from a position of power, since the concessions demanded may be correspondingly greater. It is much harder for France to strike a good bargain once Iberia has been lost and Burgundy invested with foreign units. In this instance, France requires peace to be concluded at any cost, while it is presumed that the opponent can easily carry on the conflict.


'Combat is the only effective force in war...That holds true even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came the fighting, the enemy would be destroyed.'

Even though negotiation plays a large role in Diplomacy, it must not be forgotten that all negotiations are based on the possibility of conflict. If Russia convinces Austria to abandon Rumania peacefully, this action is only valid on the presumption that, should they go to war over the province, Austria would lose, and in losing, would expose herself to the danger of even greater loss. There is no altruism in Diplomacy, merely respect for another's potential force. This fact can be seen in many of the standard moves in Diplomacy - England typically gets Norway peacefully because only he can initial take it by force. Germany typically gets Denmark for the same reason. A player should NEVER forget that the decision by arms is the final arbiter, and that either opponent can force an engagement at any time. If one relies too much on deviousness and bluff, he may find that the enemy's right to force a violent resolution to the crisis has caught him unprepared. In other words, 'He must always keep an eye on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him armed only with an ornamental rapier.'


'Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.'

Don't believe everything you hear - of course, all good Dip players know this. The true worth of this knowledge is the realization that it is the nature of man to exagerrate the bad news, and to doubt the good. Do not let unfounded rumours cause you paralysis in your moves - trust in your judgement, and stand like a rock upon which the waves break in vain. Above all, never let intelligence reports rob you of your initiative and self-confidence, for you are easy to manipulate in such a state, and will end up benefitting your allies far more than yourself.

Read the next article (On Strategy in General)

Joseph Wheeler
(corwin@wam.umd.edu)

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